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May the spirit of Newton’s method give us the power to restore unison 
between physical reality and the profoundest characteristic of Newton’s 
teaching – strict causality. 
(Einstein 1927, p. 467) 
 
The theory based on pure wave mechanics is a conceptually simple, causal 
theory. 
(Everett 1957, p. 462) 
 
Abstract   
 
Proposed derivations of the Born rule for Everettian theory are controversial. I argue 
that they are unnecessary but may provide justification for a simplified version of the 
Principal Principle. It’s also unnecessary to replace Everett’s idea that a subject splits in 
measurement contexts with the idea that subjects have linear histories which partition 
(Deutsch 1985, 2011; Saunders and Wallace 2008; Saunders 2010; Wallace 2012, 
Chapter 7; Wilson 2013; forthcoming). Linear histories were introduced to provide a 
concept of pre-measurement uncertainty and I explain why pre-measurement 
uncertainty for splitting subjects is after all coherent, though not necessary because 
Everett’s original fission interpretation of branching can arguably be rendered coherent 
without it, via reference to (Vaidman 1998; Tappenden 2011; Sebens and Carroll 2018; 
McQueen and Vaidman 2019). A deterministic and probabilistic quantum mechanics 
can be made intelligible by replacing the standard collapse postulate with a no-collapse 
postulate which identifies objective probability with relative branch weight, 
supplemented by the simplified Principal Principle and some revisionary metaphysics. 
 
Keywords Everett interpretation; measurement problem; objective probability; mind-
brain identity; semantic internalism 
 
1 Everett’s sputnik 
 
In 1957 Hugh Everett III launched what he called ‘a conceptually simple, causal theory’ 
which he described as ‘based on pure wave mechanics’ (Everett 1957, p. 462). More 
than sixty years on the idea is still up there and much discussed, yet scholars remain 
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divided as to how to make sense of it and even whether it can possibly make any sense 
at all. So Everett’s idea appears not to be so conceptually simple as he thought, or at 
least not obviously so. 
Jeffrey Barrett has cogently argued that whilst Everett’s theory may be based on 
pure wave mechanics it cannot be reduced to wave mechanics alone (Barrett 2017, p. 
31). Everett sought to eliminate the collapse postulate from standard quantum theory 
because it effectively adds a putative stochastic process to the purely deterministic 
mechanism of unitary evolution. The collapse postulate, via the Born rule, is often 
construed as assigning objective probabilities to what are understood to be mutually 
exclusive ‘possible’ outcomes of quantum measurement events, nowadays thought of 
more broadly as types of event involving decoherence. As Barrett stresses, Everett 
understood eliminating the collapse postulate to entail eliminating the concept of 
objective probability itself and sought to ground statistical evidence on a notion of 
typicality (ibid., p. 33). 
Here Everett arguably went astray, though understandably so, since replacing the 
collapse postulate with a no-collapse postulate is highly counterintuitive. All that 
follows is aimed at overcoming those negative intuitions. Rather than interpreting the 
Born rule as assigning objective probabilities to possible future outcomes of 
measurement-like events, a no-collapse postulate should interpret it as assigning 
objective probabilities to future co-existent actual outcomes, which Everett called 
‘branches’. 
If objective probability is thought of in this way it becomes a relation involving 
the absolute square of the quantum amplitude of each branch, a quantity which has 
come to be known as branch ‘weight’. The objective probability of a downstream 
branch is its weight relative to the weight of the upstream branch from which it 
emanates. This idea is not new. It has been expressed very clearly by Simon Saunders 
(1993, §7) and by David Papineau (1995, 2010). But it has been widely thought that 
something more is needed than to simply replace the standard collapse postulate by the 
no-collapse postulate. For instance Saunders, and others, have proposed ways to deal 
with an apparent lack of pre-measurement uncertainty in Everettian theory, of which 
more later. And there are several rather complex arguments which purport to show that 
the subjective probabilities assigned to future observations of quantum measurement 
outcomes should be numerically equal to the relative weights of the branches where 
those observations will be made. A result which can be interpreted as suggesting that 
the weights of those branches might just be their objective probabilities relative to the 
ready state of the measurement device. But those arguments are controversial.  
However, just as we are free to posit objective probability as associated with so-
called possibilities (or propensities) for standard stochastic quantum mechanics, so we 
are free to posit the identification of relative branch weight with objective probability 
for a non-standard ‘dendritic’ quantum mechanics. In both cases the posit is aimed at 
justifying a subject’s assignment of subjective probabilities to the observation of distinct 
futures arising from a set of initial conditions. A posit is simply a hypothesis and the 
hypothesis that relative branch weight is objective probability can provide the basis for 
a probabilistic and deterministic wave mechanics. 
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If objective probability does indeed exist out there in the quantum world then that’s a 
novel discovery which the study of radiation and particles has led to. In that case 
objective probability is a something-we-know-not-what whose existence gives rise to 
the observation of frequency distributions. We have no reason to suppose that our 
ordinary uses of the term ‘probability’ should in any way determine the nature of that 
something. Everettian theory arguably suggests that that something just is relative 
branch weight. As such, the nature of branch weight would seem to be that of a sort of 
non-spatiotemporal extension. Neither a length nor a duration, but something of that ilk. 
As if a branch were like a road of width X and its bifurcation like that of a road dividing 
into roads of widths Y and Z, where Y+Z=X. The idea is reminiscent of what Michael 
Lockwood called a superpositional ‘dimension’, attributing the idea to David Deutsch 
(Lockwood 1989, p. 232). 
Preposterous as this may seem, that is the idea which I shall be defending in what 
follows. The proposal is that replacing the conventional collapse postulate of quantum 
mechanics with the no-collapse postulate can provide the basis for making Everettian 
probability fully intelligible, something which remains a matter of deep dispute amongst 
experts. In order to explain how that can be so I shall begin by considering the ways in 
which the concepts of branching and uncertainty have arisen in Everettian theory. 
 
2 Quantum fission 
 
Everett suggested that for an idealized experimental setup, where the spin of an x-spin-
up particle is measured on a different axis, the apparatus ‘splits’ onto branches where 
the apparatuses on each branch are the elements of an apparatus in superposition on the 
pointer basis, with an up element indicating spin-up and a down element indicating spin-
down1. Objects in the environment of the apparatus become entangled with it and are 
thereby also caused to evolve into superpositions and, in particular, the body of any 
subject observing the apparatus is caused to split and the elements of that corporeal 
superposition register the observation of up and of down2. Everett wrote: 
 
The ‘trajectory’ of the memory configuration of an observer 
performing a sequence of measurements is thus not a linear 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The pointer basis is arguably determined by the process of decoherence. See (Wallace 
2012, Ch. 3) for details. The measurement idealization ignores many bizarre low 
amplitude branches and so takes the absolute square of amplitude for the up and down 
branches to sum to 1. 2	  Roland Fraïssé argued that a splitting event gives rise to a ramifier, the lightspeed 
propagation of the branching of spacetime (Fraïssé 1974; 1982; 1986). Given that any 
splitting event creates a gravitational disturbance, this suggests an interface between 
general relativity and quantum mechanics. Note that the different views in (McQueen 
and Vaidman 2019) and (Sebens and Carroll 2018) turn on a difference in their 
interpretations of the process of branching. 
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sequence of memory configurations, but a branching tree, with all 
possible outcomes existing simultaneously. 
(op.cit., p. 460) 
 
In an unpublished manuscript he also wrote: 
 
As an analogy one can imagine an intelligent amoeba with a good 
memory. As time progresses the amoeba is constantly splitting, 
each time the resulting amoebas having the same memories as the 
parent. Our amoeba hence does not have a life line, but a life tree. 
(Barrett and Byrne 2012, p. 69) 
 
This concept of dendritic structure needs some unpacking for there seem to be two 
distinct types of ‘splitting’ involved. When an amoeba splits we would normally say 
that the two downstream cells are parts of the original. Similarly the up and down 
elements of the superposed apparatus can be thought of as ‘superpositional’ parts of a 
single object, an idea which David Wallace refers to as the Hydra View (op.cit., p. 281). 
Since the measurement process involves decoherence, the up and down branches of the 
apparatus are effectively causally isolated from one another.  
But when Alice makes the idealized spin measurement she splits into Aliceup and 
Alicedown who observe the outcomes up and down. And we think of Aliceup and 
Alicedown as distinct subjects, not as parts of a single subject. This is not amoeba-like 
splitting, it’s personal fission, a topic which has been much discussed independently of 
Everettian theory. Note that Everett attributes a dendritic structure to ‘memory 
configurations’ and that concept can indeed be subsumed under the Hydra view. A 
recording device coupled with the measurement apparatus will evolve into a 
superposition whose elements are devices recording up and down and those elements 
can be considered as superpositional parts of a single superposed recording device. 
So it appears to be the concept of subjects, not that of objects, which is what 
creates problems for Everett’s allusion to amoeba-like splitting. We cannot conceive of 
a single subject observing up and down simultaneously. At the same time, it does seem 
that brains can be thought of as recording devices. Alice’s brain prior to measurement, 
like the apparatus, can be understood to evolve into a superposition with two elements, a 
brain recording up and a brain recording down, which, as before, can be regarded as 
parts of a single superposed brain. This can seem worryingly mysterious, but it need 
not. For consider an inscription of the sentence ‘the result of experiment X is up and the 
result of experiment X is down’. The inscription contains the inscriptions of two 
sentences as parts whilst the contained inscriptions are of sentences which express 
contradictory propositions. As will become clear, making the no-collapse postulate 
intelligible apparently requires brains to have a similar sort of relation to observations as 
do inscriptions to sentences, a variety of type-token relation. So whilst Aliceup and 
Alicedown are distinct subjects making contradictory observations, their brains can be 
parts of a single cerebral superposition. 
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But if Aliceup and Alicedown are distinct subjects they cannot both be identical to Alice. 
And there seem to be no grounds for believing that Alice has become one or the other of 
them. Some Everettian theorists have glossed over this difficulty by simply referring to 
Aliceup and Alicedown as Alice’s ‘successors’ (Papineau 2003) or ‘descendants’ 
(McQueen and Vaidman 2019). The problem appears to be this. On a standard 
stochastic interpretation of the measurement setup Alice will either observe up or 
observe down. She’ll have a single ‘descendant’, herself. So it would seem that she can 
unproblematically be uncertain about what she’ll observe. She can assign subjective 
probabilities to the future observation of up or down on the basis of her assessment of 
the objective probabilities for each possibility. But in the face of personal fission how 
can Alice even expect to survive? 
I shall not attempt here to survey the extensive literature on personal fission but 
shall adopt what strikes me as the most perspicuous way of dealing with the problem, 
Ted Sider’s stage theory (Sider 1996; 2001, p. 201)3. Others may prefer a different 
analysis of trans-temporal identity. A useful discussion of some alternatives and their 
comparison with stage theory can be found in (Hawley 2001). 
 
2.1 Stage theory 
 
Stage theory is inspired by modal counterpart theory where a subject or object is not 
numerically identical with the modal counterpart which it might have been. Similarly, 
subjects and objects are not taken to be numerically identical with what they were and 
what they will be. So Aliceup and Alicedown are what have come to be known as future 
temporal counterparts of Alice, which entails that she bears the relation will be to 
Aliceup and to Alicedown. Contrariwise, Alice is a past temporal counterpart of both 
Aliceup and Alicedown so each of them bears the relation was to Alice. 
Stage theory certainly has some counterintuitive consequences, as is well 
recognized. For instance, a person in prison is never the same person as the one who 
committed the crime. However, if the person in prison was the person who committed 
the crime that could seem a good enough justification for the person in prison being in 
prison. Also, if you’ve apparently been alone in a room for an hour stage theory has it 
that there have been many momentary persons in many momentary rooms during that 
hour. Still, at any given moment there’s only one person in one room and each of those 
persons, except the first one, was each of the earlier persons. 
But there remains a problem for applying stage theory to Everettian personal 
fission which has not, so far as I know, been addressed. In a context such as that of our 
model spin measurement the temporal counterpart relations for subjects and objects 
need to be different. The immediate post-measurement temporal counterpart of Alice’s 
brain includes two brains which are superpositional parts of a single object, one part 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Hilary Greaves introduced stage theory independently to Everettian theory, without 
reference to Sider (Greaves 2004, §4.1.1). Without reference to Greaves, but with 
reference to Sider, stage theory is employed in an Everettian context in (Tappenden 
2008, p. 313). 
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recording up and the other part recording down. The superposition of the two brains is a 
single future temporal counterpart of Alice’s brain. Her brain evolves into a 
superposition. It’s spatiotemporal continuity which connects Alice’s brain with its 
future temporal counterparts. But the pair [Aliceup and Alicedown] had better not be a 
future temporal counterpart of Alice for reasons which will become apparent. Resolving 
this problem requires further work which I’ll come to in §2.4.  
But even given a resolution of this problem for stage theory there’s a further 
problem for fission. Alice, if well informed, knows that she’ll split. She will be Aliceup 
and she will be Alicedown, though she will not become a pair of people. But in what 
sense is she uncertain about her future experience?  
 
2.2 Lewisian uncertainty debugged 
 
If Alice believes that she’ll split it can seem obvious that she must lack uncertainty 
about the outcome of her measurement. But if she lacks uncertainty how can she 
intelligibly assign probabilities to outcomes? Hilary Greaves refers to that as the 
incoherence problem for Everettian theory (Greaves 2004, §1). Her proposed solution to 
the incoherence problem involved rejecting the need for uncertainty. She contrasted 
fission with what she called the subjective uncertainty view for which Saunders and 
Wallace were later to become champions. The subjective uncertainty program has 
sought pre-measurement uncertainty by replacing Everett’s fission model of branching 
with what can be called the partitioning linear histories model, which I’ll discuss in §3. 
For standard quantum theory uncertainty as to future observations consists in 
assigning subjective probabilities to those futures and for a stochastic theory which 
associates objective probabilities with those futures subjective probabilities are assigned 
on the basis of what David Lewis has called the Principal Principle (Lewis 1980, p. 
266). Since the no-collapse postulate also associates objective probabilities with 
measurement outcomes any appeal to uncertainty must involve something like the 
Principal Principle though it turns out to differ somewhat from what Lewis had in mind. 
Lewis’s concept of objective probability was stochastic. That’s clear when he 
writes: 
 
Next question. As before, except that now it is afternoon and you have 
evidence that became available after the coin was tossed at noon. 
Maybe you know for certain that it fell heads; maybe some fairly 
reliable witness has told you that it fell heads; maybe the witness has 
told you that it fell heads in nine out of ten tosses of which the noon 
toss was one. You remain as sure as ever that the chance of heads, just 
before noon, was 50%. To what degree should you believe that the coin 
tossed at noon fell heads? 
Answer. Not 50%, but something not far short of 100%. 
(ibid.,  p. 265) 
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Lewis’s coin stands in for stochastic quantum processes; he earlier makes reference to 
the decay of a tritium nucleus. Just as the nucleus does or does not decay within a given 
period, so the coin falls exclusively either heads or tails. Lewis concludes as follows: 
 
If evidence bears in a direct enough way on the outcome - a way that 
may nevertheless fall short of outright implication - then it may bear on 
your beliefs about outcomes otherwise than by way of your beliefs 
about the chances of the outcomes. Resiliency under all evidence 
whatever would be extremely unreasonable. We can only say that 
degrees of belief about outcomes that are based on certainty about 
chances are resilient under admissible evidence. The previous question 
gave examples of admissible evidence; this question gave examples of 
inadmissible evidence. 
(ibid., original emphasis) 
 
Inadmissible evidence for Lewis is evidence about the future. If you believe that the 
chance that the coin will fall heads at noon is 50% but ‘some fairly reliable witness’ 
tells you that after noon that the coin has fallen heads, but you have not been able to see 
the result for yourself, then your belief that the coin has fallen heads becomes 
‘something not far short of 100%’. 
As Mauricio Suárez puts it: 
 
On the Humean approach defended by David Lewis, for example, 
chance is a function of the entire state or history of the world up 
to a certain time, that is, ChHt(x), where Ht is the history of the 
world, w, up to time t. Chance is thus both world and time relative 
(Lewis 1986, p. 91).  
(Suárez 2017, p. 1167) 
 
Suárez’s assertion that Lewisian chance is world-relative refers to Lewis’s ‘modal 
realism’, fully presented in (Lewis 1986). If Lewis’s concept of a stochastic process is 
replaced by that of a branching process the idea of inadmissible evidence disappears. 
Wallace has made this point (op. cit., p. 150). Here I expand on the idea in the context 
of viewing Everettian subjects as having dendritic histories which, as we’ll see later, 
Wallace rejects. Post-measurement, Aliceup’s observation of up doesn’t confirm that the 
apparatus which Alice faced in the ready state has come to indicate up. Likewise for 
Alicedown. Because what Aliceup and Alicedown each identify as a measuring device is but 
a superpositional element of the device into which the original has evolved. Given the 
no-collapse postulate, if Alice were to have complete knowledge of the future it would 
tell her that her apparatus would fission into an apparatus indicating up on a branch 
who’s objective probability is, say, 0.7 and an apparatus indicating down on a branch 
who’s objective probability is 0.3. And that knowledge would do nothing to undermine 
her prior judgment of the objective probabilities and so there would be no reason to 
count it inadmissible. 
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Lewis was viscerally opposed to the idea of what he called a branching world, writing: 
 
The trouble with branching exactly is that it conflicts with our 
ordinary presupposition that we have a single future. If two 
futures are equally mine, one with a sea fight tomorrow and one 
without, it is nonsense to wonder which way it will be – it will be 
both ways – and yet I do wonder. The theory of branching suits 
those who think this wondering is nonsense. 
(Lewis 1986, p. 209, original emphasis) 
 
Quite rightly, Lewis sees the idea that a person can fission as unacceptable because ‘it 
conflicts with our ordinary presupposition that we have a single future’. And he 
specifically links that opposition with rejection of Everettian theory in a letter dated 21st 
December 1987 (Beebee and Fisher, forthcoming). In what follows I shall explain how 
‘wondering’ about quantum measurement outcomes need not be nonsense in the 
absence of stochasticity. From the dendritic point of view Lewis’s Principal Principle 
doesn’t need to be qualified in order to take into account the admissibility of evidence, it 
can simply be taken as stating that subjective probabilities should be assigned equal to 
what the relevant objective probabilities are believed to be. Of course judgment as to 
what the value of relevant objective probabilities are will be based on statistical 
evidence, but that’s a different issue which I’ll come to in §4. 
But the simplified Principal Principle which I’ve just described, and shall 
hereafter refer to as PP, is an assumption. It has an intuitive appeal; it seems obvious 
that if you believe that the objective probability of some event occurring is X then you 
should assign a subjective probability of X to the future observation of that event, other 
things being equal. But I shall be arguing that some claimed derivations of the Born rule 
for Everettian theory may be reinterpreted as justifications of PP. In the meantime, the 
combination of the no-collapse postulate and PP entails that Alice pre-measurement 
assigns subjective probabilities to multiple co-existent futures. 
  
2.3 Fission and pre-measurement uncertainty 
 
Tim Maudlin has written: 
 
It is easy to state the problem of probability in the Everett theory: 
probabilities are standardly attached to alternatives 
(Maudlin 2014, pp. 799-800, original emphasis) 
 
If Alice believes that she will split and assigns subjective probabilities of 0.7 and 0.3 to 
her future observation of up and of down no alternatives seem to be involved so if 
Maudlin’s point is to be met some sort of no-standard concept is called for. I have 
introduced a non-standard concept of the mind-body relation which appears to allow 
probabilities to attach to co-existents rather than alternatives (Tappenden 2017, §2). 
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Consider a large but not infinite set of isomorphic universes in which quantum 
measurement processes are stochastic. At corresponding spactime locations in each 
universe a version of our model spin measurement takes place with the result that, given 
the law of large numbers, the original set of universes partitions into a subset of measure 
0.7 where up occurs and a subset of measure 0.3 where down occurs. 
Now introduce subjects. The standard interpretation of the setup would introduce 
corresponding subjects, one in each universe. Each would be manifest as a 
doppelganger beside the measurement apparatus. And it could be supposed that each 
subject believes that the measurement process about to take place is stochastic and that 
the objective probabilities for the outcomes up and down are 0.7 and 0.3 respectively. 
That belief might have arisen from each subject having done a series of tests with the 
measuring apparatus. 
A non-standard way to interpret the setup is to suppose that there’s a single 
subject whose body is the set of doppelgangers. What that observer refers to as a single 
measuring apparatus is the set of corresponding apparatuses, one in each universe. That 
is what I have called the unitary interpretation of mind. On this analysis both the 
‘unitary’ subject and the ‘plural’ subjects are in exactly the same mental state. All the 
difference is in the worlds, not in the minds of the subjects. What has changed is that 
there is one token of that mental state rather than multiple tokens and it’s integral to the 
alternative interpretation that the constitution of objects in the subjects’ environments 
changes too. There’s more on that in	  §5. The unitary subject has just the same beliefs as 
the original multiple subjects and so believes that the measuring device to which s/he 
refers will exclusively yield the result up or down and s/he assigns objective 
probabilities of 0.7 and 0.3 to those alternatives. 
But the unitary subject is mistaken. What in fact happens to the single measuring 
device is that it splits into two devices, each of which is a subset of the original. And the 
subject also splits into two subjects, one observing up and the other observing down. 
Each subject’s body is a set of doppelgangers in a subset of the original set of universes, 
the subset measures being 0.7 and 0.3. 
What the thought experiment shows is that if the unitary interpretation of mind is 
coherent then it’s coherent that a subject who believes s/he faces a stochastic process in 
fact faces a dendritic process. So it’s coherent that an assignment of objective 
probabilities to what are believed to be alternative outcomes is in fact an assignment to 
co-existent outcomes. The question which then arises is what difference it makes if the 
subject comes to believe that s/he faces a dendritic process rather than a stochastic 
process. Does s/he cease to be uncertain about what will happen? 
Alice knows that she’ll split into Aliceup observing up on a branch of weight 0.7 
and Alicedown observing down on a branch of weight 0.3. She also knows that the 
outcome up will occur and that the outcome down will occur. If the outcome up is going 
to occur the objective probability that it will occur is 1, no? 
That’s an intuition which can be resisted. The objective probability of the 
occurrence of up is 0.7 because that’s the objective probability of the branch on which it 
occurs relative to the ready state’s branch, according to the no-collapse postulate. What 
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has objective probability 1 is the combined occurrence of both up and down since 0.7 + 
0.3 = 1. 
If that’s right it’s possible to understand Alice as being uncertain as to what she’ll 
observe because, via the no-collapse postulate and PP, she assigns subjective 
probabilities of 0.7 to her future observation of up and 0.3 to her future observation of 
down. She does so because, applying stage theory, she knows she will be Aliceup on a 
branch whose objective probability is 0.7 and she will be Alicedown  on a branch whose 
objective probability is 0.3. What Alice is certain of is that both outcomes will occur but 
she doesn’t assign a subjective probability of 1 to observing both outcomes because she 
does not believe that she will be the pair [Aliceup and Alicedown]. She’s not uncertain 
about which outcome will occur but she is uncertain about what she’ll observe. 
That’s a response to the incoherence problem for Everettian theory. But its 
intelligibility seems to depend on a non-standard and counterintuitive interpretation of 
the mind-body relation. What I shall do now is consider more conservative responses to 
the incoherence problem and assess their relation to the unitary interpretation of mind. 
But first a further note on stage theory in the light of this section. 
 
2.4 Stage theory again 
 
Recall that for stage theory to be coherently applied to quantum fission there must be 
different temporal counterpart relations for subjects and objects. Alice’s brain’s future 
temporal counterpart is a pair of brains, each a superpositional part of a superposed 
brain. Alice herself cannot have the pair [Aliceup and Alicedown] as a future temporal 
counterpart because that would mean that Alice will become a pair of people having 
contradictory experiences, which is hard to make sense of at the very least. The unitary 
interpretation of mind makes it possible to sidestep this problem. 
The reason is that the criteria for individuating subjects and objects become 
different. Whereas objects such as brains are individuated by their spatiotemporal 
location, subjects are individuated by their cognitive contents. The connection which 
makes Aliceup and Alicedown future temporal counterparts of Alice is cognitive 
continuity, not spatiotemporal continuity. Aliceup and Alicedown are distinct individual 
subjects who have all their cognitive contents in common, except for their perceptions 
of the outcomes of Alice’s measurement. So whereas Alice’s brain’s future temporal 
counterpart is a single superposition with brains as elements, Alice’s future temporal 
counterparts do not include a pair of subjects observing both up and down. There’s just 
Aliceup individuated by her cognitive content and Alicedown individualted by her 
cognitive content. 
Subsequently, Aliceup and Alicedown can become much more different cognitively, 
and go on to fission in different ways. The unitary interpretation of mind entails that two 
or more brains (or functionally equivalent objects) which instance the same cognitive 
content, however distributed in spacetime, instance a single individual subject. If, as a 
result of a climax of improbability, a brain were to come into existence in the 
Andromeda galaxy which was isomorphic to Aliceup’s brain, that distant object would 
also instance Aliceup’s mind, despite having no spatiotemporal connection with Alice’s 
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brain. Bizarre as it is, that’s the proposal. And there’s no implication of mind-body 
dualism, as traditionally understood. As I said earlier, it’s rather like the relationship 
between a sentence and its inscriptions. Except that for the putting of marks on paper to 
be a token inscription it must be causally, and so spatiotemporally, connected with the 
‘brain’ of a subject. 
Everett can reasonably be said to have replaced the conventional stochastic 
interpretation of quantum mechanics with a dendritic interpretation, where subjects and 
objects ‘split’ in measurement contexts. But in combining stage theory with Everettian 
theory it’s important to note that the histories of subjects and objects are dendritic in 
different ways. Objects branch in a sense similar to the way a river branches into an 
estuary: just as all the branches are parts of the same river, so the future branches of 
Alice’s brain are superpositional parts of one superposed brain. The history of Alice’s 
brain is linear, its temporal parts are well ordered. But Aliceup and Alicedown are not 
parts of one subject, they’re simultaneous temporal parts of a single history whose 
temporal parts are partially ordered, not totally ordered.  An advantage of stage theory 
is that it can describe both histories which have totally ordered temporal parts and 
histories which have partially ordered temporal parts. However, for stage theory to be 
employed in describing the histories of Everett’s fissioning subjects the unitary 
interpretation of mind is apparently required in order to distinguish between the 
temporal counterpart relations for subjects and objects. 
 
2.5 Greaves and Vaidman on incoherence 
 
I shall now set aside the previous argument for the coherence of pre-measurement 
uncertainty for the fission model of branching and consider what other responses to the 
incoherence problem have been proposed by fission theorists. We shall see that the 
arguments lead us back to the unitary interpretation of mind. 
Greaves responded to the problem by dismissing any need for uncertainty and 
suggesting that Alice can ‘care’ about future outcomes, developing the idea of what she 
called a caring measure (op. cit., §2.2). In a later paper she acknowledges that a similar 
idea had earlier been proposed by Lev Vaidman (2002, §6.4). The way the Vaidman-
Greaves caring measure is meant to deal with the incoherence problem is by providing 
reasons for a subject to act pre-measurement in a similar way to the way s/he would act 
if believing a stochastic interpretation of the measurement process. That is, the caring 
measure is supposed to induce a subject to act as if the outcomes were alternative 
possibilities with associated objective probabilities (Greaves 2004, §1). 
The paradigm testbed for this idea is a gambling setup where Alice is presumed to 
be a betting woman and is offered wagers on outcomes. According to Vaidman and 
Greaves, Alice should care about rewards and losses as a function of their perceived 
utility combined with the weights of the branches on which they occur. With the result 
that Alice places bets in what she believes to be a dendritic setup in the same way as she 
would have done if she had believed it was a stochastic setup. Greaves concludes: 
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I have argued (section 2) that the Everettian has no need to claim title to 
the term ‘probability’, over and above her needs (a) to formulate a 
strategy for rational action in the face of branching, and (b) to be 
entitled to regard quantum mechanics, given the sequences of 
experimental outcomes we have in fact observed, as empirically 
confirmed. 
(ibid., §6) 
 
Here (a) is what Greaves calls the practical problem for Everettian theory and (b) is the 
epistemic problem, which I shall discuss in §4. It’s in response to the practical problem 
that Greaves and Vaidman invoke the concept of caring measure. The idea has been 
criticized at length by David Albert who forcefully concludes that the strategy ‘looks 
silly and sneaky and unmotivated and wrong’ (Albert 2010, p.364). 
However, in thinking that Everettian fission requires abandoning uncertainty 
Greaves overlooked something, as did Saunders when he subsequently characterized 
fission thus:  
 
The attempt to ground EQM [Everettian Quantum Mechanics] on 
[statistics and rationality] alone, disavowing all talk of probability and 
uncertainty, has been dubbed the fission programme. 
(Saunders 2010, p. 183) 
 
What both Greaves and Saunders overlook in their characterizations of fission is 
Vaidman’s introduction of the concept of post-measurement, pre-observation 
uncertainty, of which more shortly (Vaidman 1998, p. 253). Greaves at least 
acknowledges it but sees the concept of caring measure as having explanatory priority 
(op.cit., §4.3). I shall now argue that, on the contrary, it is post-measurement, pre-
observation uncertainty which explains pre-measurement caring, thereby providing a 
response to Albert. 
Vaidman’s idea is this. If Aliceup and Alicedown are ‘blindfolded’, i.e. cognitively 
isolated from the pointer readings, each can be uncertain as to which branch she’s 
located on post-measurement. Each doesn’t know whether she’s on the up branch or the 
down branch. The assumption that blindfolded Aliceup and Alicedown should assign 
subjective probabilities equal to the branch weights has been called the Born-Vaidman 
rule (Tappenden 2011, §2). It requires justification, but even given that assumption 
there have been some dismissive responses to Vaidman’s idea. Albert has written: 
 
The trouble with Lev’s uncertainty is that it seems altogether 
avoidable, and that it comes too late in the game. The uncertainty we 
need – the uncertainty that quantum mechanics imposes on us – is 
something not to be bypassed 
(op.cit., pp. 367-8, original emphasis) 
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In response to Albert, I have argued that something which cannot be bypassed is the 
possibility of Vaidman’s post-measurement, pre-observation uncertainty (Tappenden 
2011, §4). Prior to placing a bet, Alice knows that it would be possible for her to be 
ignorant of the outcome post-measurement. All she’d need to do is wear a blindfold. 
And in such a state of ignorance Alice can be confident that she would make exactly the 
same betting judgment if she could place a stake before removing the blindfold. But the 
rule is that stakes must be laid before the measurement. Knowing that, Alice in a state of 
Vaidmanian ignorance would regret not having laid a stake if she’d not done so. Alice, 
knowing in advance that she would regret not having laid a stake if she were in a state 
of Vaidmanian ignorance post-measurement has every reason to lay that stake pre-
measurement. 
A complete rationale for pre-measurement decision-making is provided by the 
possibility of Vaidmanian ignorance. And the Vaidman-Greaves concept of caring 
measure is effectively transformed so that what Alice needs to care about pre-
measurement it the betting behavior that she would regret not having executed if she 
were in a state of Vaidmanian ignorance. The unbypassable possibility of Vaidmanian 
ignorance does the job just as well as pre-measurement ignorance, and on reflection that 
ought not to be surprising. Think about betting on ordinary dice rolls. The way you bet 
is just the same whether your eyes are open prior to the roll or closed after the roll, 
given that the payouts on different numbers remain the same. The rule that bets must be 
laid before the roll is made for the sighted. However, the argument does depend on 
justifying the Born-Vaidman rule. 
 
2.6 Justifying the Born-Vaidman rule 
 
Returning to our model spin measurement, it could seem that Aliceup and Alicedown in a 
state of Vaidmanian ignorance must be constrained by a principle of indifference. Each 
Alice knows that she’s one of two people and each, for all she knows, could be either 
one. So each should assign subjective probabilities of 0.5 to being on the up branch and 
to being on the down branch, irrespective of the branch weights. Clearly the Everettian 
project would be undermined in one fell swoop if blindfolded Aliceup and Alicedown do 
not have reason to assign subjective probabilities to being on the up or the down branch 
equal to the branch weights. 
The task of justifying the Born-Vaidman rule has been addressed in (Sebens and 
Carroll 2018) and (McQueen and Vaidman 2019). The arguments differ in their 
interpretation of the branching process but both conclude that blindfolded Aliceup and 
Alicedown should indeed assign subjective probabilities of 0.7 and 0.3 to the future 
observation of up and down respectively, counterintuitive as that may seem.  
Sebens and Carroll propose what they call an Epistemic Separability Principle 
(ESP): 
 
ESP: Suppose that universe U contains within it a set of 
subsystems, S; such that every agent in an internally qualitatively 
identical state to agent A is located in some subsystem that is an 
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element of S. The probability that A ought to assign to being 
located in a particular subsystem, X	  ∊ S, given that they are in U, 
is identical in any possible universe that also contains subsystems 
S in the same exact states (and does not contain any copies of the 
agent in an internally qualitatively identical state that are not 
located in S). 
(op.cit., p. 16) 
 
Critics of Sebens’ and Carroll’s argument might well point up the ‘ought’ in the ESP 
and argue that the principle has simply been assumed in order to yield the desired result. 
However, I have argued that the ESP is entailed by the unitary interpretation of mind 
because it reinterprets the mentality of copies of agents in ‘internally qualitatively 
identical’ states (Tappenden 2017 §2). According to that reinterpretation blindfolded 
Alice does not split on making her quantum measurement. Rather, her mind spans the 
up and down branches. Her brain evolves into a superposition of two brains, one on 
each branch, but those brains do not instance the minds of distinct subjects because they 
are cognitively identical even though physically different in some respects. As a result, 
the measuring device in blindfolded Alice’s environment post-measurement is a 
superposition of devices pointing up and down (ibid., p. 14). 
Given this reinterpretation of the setup it could seem that the incoherence problem 
for fission reappears since blindfolded Alice post-measurement is no longer uncertain 
about which branch she’s on. Rather, if well-informed, she’s certain that she’s in the 
presence of a measuring device in superposition. However, as I’ve pointed out, 
Vaidmanian uncertaintly is easily recovered (ibid.). Let Alice remain blindfolded post-
measurement and let a bell be rung on the up branch and a whistle blown on the down 
branch without Alice knowing which sound goes with which outcome. According to the 
unitary interpretation of mind she will then split into Aliceup and Alicedown, each 
uncertain as to which branch she’s on. The previous argument in response to Albert 
therefore still applies. The possibility of post-measurement, pre-observation uncertainty 
in fission contexts is all that’s required to motivate rational action pre-measurement. 
But the reappearance of the unitary interpretation of mind is noteworthy. It seems 
to put Sebens’ and Carroll’s justification of the Born-Vaidman rule on a less arbitrary, 
better motivated footing than their ESP. And a similar argument may be applied to 
(McQueen and Vaidman 2019). McQueen’s and Vaidman’s approach appeals to what 
they call the local supervenience principle: 
 
whatever happens in region A depends on the quantum 
description of this region and its immediate vicinity. 
(ibid.,	  §4) 
 
The idea is this. If blindfolded Alice performs her measurement in region A and then 
Bob performs a similar measurement in region B if and only if Alice’s measuring device 
records up, then Alice’s post-measurement, pre-observation subjective probability 
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assignments should only take into account what has happened to her measuring device 
not what has or has not happened to Bob’s device. 
McQueen’s and Vaidman’s local supervenience principle can also be shown to be 
entailed by the unitary interpretation of mind because relative to blindfolded Alice post-
measurement her local measuring device in region A becomes a superposition and 
Bob’s device in region B either does or does not become a superposition depending on 
whether he initiates a measurement. Either way, when it comes to blindfolded Alice 
making her post-measurement subjective probability assignments it’s only the state of 
her local superposed measuring device which she needs to take into account (which has 
evolved into a superposition of a device on the up branch, weight 0.7 and a device on 
the down branch, weight 0.3). When Alice’s blindfold is removed post measurement she 
splits. Aliceup is on the branch where her measuring device shows up and distant Bob’s 
device is in superposition. And Alicedown is on the branch where her measuring device 
shows down and distant Bob’s device has remained in the ready state. And post-
measurement, before Alice’s blindfold is removed, Vaidman’s post-measurement, pre-
observation self-location uncertainty can be recovered with the help of a bell and a 
whistle linked to the device in region A. 
The upshot is that if the Born-Vaidman rule is taken to be justified then an 
alternative response to the incoherence problem for the fission interpretation of 
branching is in place. Given the assumption that pre-measurement uncertainty doesn’t 
apply in fission contexts, pre-measurement behavior can be guided by the possibility of 
post-measurement, pre-observation uncertainty. That argument is not widely recognized 
and deserves to be underlined, however, what’s it got to do with the no-collapse 
postulate? 
 
2.7 Indefiniteness and uncertainty 
 
Both the Sebens-Carroll and McQueen-Vaidman arguments claim to show that 
blindfolded Aliceup and Alicedown should assign subjective probabilities to future 
observations (when the blindfolds are removed) equal to what they take the branch 
weights to be. Neither argument claims that branch weight is to be identified with 
objective probability but their reinterpretation in the light of the unitary interpretation of 
mind changes the perspective. 
Recall that the unitary interpretation of mind entails that blindfolded Alice does 
not split post-measurement and Vaidmanian self-location uncertainty is recovered by 
causing Alice to split via use of the bell and whistle. So we have the conceptual 
juxtaposition of a single blindfolded Alice being in the presence of a measuring device 
in an indefinite pointer state and then Aliceup and Alicedown each being uncertain as to 
which branch they’re on. 
Dwelling on this juxtaposition is instructive. The sounding of the bell and whistle 
causes Alice to cease to be a subject who is certain, we can suppose, that she’s in the 
presence of a measuring device in an indefinite state. She fissions into two subjects each 
being uncertain as to which branch they’re on. In that case, is it really plausible that 
Alice post-measurement, pre-bell-and-whistle has no grounds for assigning subjective 
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probabilities to the observation of up and down once the blindfold is removed whereas 
Aliceup and Alicedown do have grounds for subjective probability assignments? I suggest 
that such a radical change in point of view brought about by the bell-and-whistle is not 
plausible. There are grounds for post-measurement, pre-fission Alice to assign 
subjective probabilities in just the way Aliceup and Alicedown can and those grounds do 
not involve being in a state of self-location ignorance. They involve invoking the no-
collapse postulate plus PP. The no-collapse postulate entails that the absolute squares of 
amplitude of the up and down elements of the superposed measuring device in 
blindfolded Alice’s environment post-measurement, pre-fission are their objective 
probabilities relative to the ready state of the apparatus. And Alice, we can suppose, 
knows that when the blindfold is removed she’ll split because she’ll be observationally 
exposed to a measuring device in an indefinite pointer state. Applying PP, she should 
thus assign subjective probabilities of 0.7 and 0.3 to the future observation of up and 
down respectively. 
The arguments so far have in a sense come full circle. I earlier argued that if the 
unitary interpretation of mind is coherent then it’s coherent that Alice pre-measurement, 
knowing that she’ll split, is in a state of uncertainty because the no-collapse postulate 
plus PP entail that she assigns subjective probabilities of 0.7 and 0.3 to the future 
observation of up and down. I then argued that even if pre-measurement uncertainty is 
set aside the incoherence problem can be resolved by showing that rational action pre-
measurement can be assured via the possibility of post-measurement, pre-observation 
uncertainty, itself justified by the Sebens-Carroll and McQueen-Vaidman arguments 
whose key assumptions are entailed by the unitary interpretation of mind. Furthermore, 
the unitary interpretation of mind appears to have a fundamental role to play if stage 
theory is to be used to describe the partially ordered histories of fissioning subjects. 
Clearly, trying to make sense of the no-collapse postulate in the context of 
Everett’s fission interpretation of branching flirts with some radical metaphysics. Might 
there be a more conservative way to make sense of Everettian probability? Saunders, 
Wallace and Alastair Wilson think so since they all defend, in different ways, what 
Wallace calls the Conservative View of Everettian theory (op.cit., p. 270). The idea is to 
replace the fission interpretation of branching with varieties of a partitioning linear 
histories interpretation. I shall summarize the latter and then suggest that it’s not, as 
claimed, a deterministic theory since stochasticity appears to be covertly re-introduced. 
 
3 Overlap and divergence 
 
I should begin by noting that Saunders, Wallace and Wilson are sympathetic to the idea 
that objective probability should be identified with relative branch weight (Saunders 
2010, p. 182; Wallace 2012, p. 141; Wilson 2013, pp. 771-72). The idea can seem to be 
suggested by the Deutsch-Wallace argument, as explained below. In that case, since the 
no-collapse postulate is the hypothesis that objective probability is relative branch 
weight, the Deutsch-Wallace argument, if good, would then become a justification of 
PP because it shows that subjective probabilities should be assigned equal to objective 
probabilities. 
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The overlap interpretation of branching was introduced by Saunders and Wallace in 
order to establish pre-measurement uncertainty for Everettian theory; their joint paper 
was entitled Branching and uncertainty. Instead of interpreting subjects as splitting, and 
so having dendritic histories, they interpret them as having conventional linear histories. 
They write: 
 
To conclude: if – as Lewis proposes – in cases of personal 
branching we say that there are two persons present even before 
the branch, it is at least somewhat natural to attribute two sets of 
thoughts to those persons; in the case of worlds branching, it 
becomes entirely natural. As a result, talk of uncertainty in the 
face of branching comes out as true. 
(Saunders and Wallace 2008, p. 303) 
 
The reference is to David Lewis’s analysis of thought experiments involving personal 
fission (Lewis, 1976). Applied to our model spin measurement, Aliceup and Alicedown 
are each to be identified with a linear history and those histories overlap prior to 
measurement, which is to say that they have their temporal parts in common. Saunders 
and Wallace refer to Lewis’s analogy of overlapping roads (ibid., p. 295). The road 
from Southville to Westville and road from Southville to Eastville may overlap between 
Southville and Northville, before they go their separate ways: 
 
Westville        Eastville 
\             / 
Northville 
| 
Southville 
 
So Aliceup and Alicedown both exist before the measurement, but have their temporal 
parts in common. Saunders and Wallace differ from Lewis in concluding from this that 
‘it is at least somewhat natural to attribute two sets of thoughts to those persons’ (ibid., 
p. 303). In applying the idea to Everettian theory they extend this view of personal 
identity to the identity of worlds: 
 
As goes the incoherence problem of EQM [Everettian quantum 
mechanics], it is now rather clear, from Section 2, of what we are 
ignorant: we don’t know which world—which branch, big-bang 
to end-of-time—is ours. It is lack of knowledge de se, uncertainty 
of where we are located, not as a stage S but as a world-stage 
<W,S> or world-time <W,t>, among the branching worlds. 
(ibid., p. 301) 
 
So, prior to measurement Alice is one of a host of subjects who have isomorphic bodies, 
each inhabiting one of a set of ‘big-bang to end-of-time worlds’ which, because they 
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overlap, have remained isomorphic up until the measurement event, at which time the 
set partitions into a subset where the outcome up occurs and a subset where the outcome 
down occurs. In each world the outcome of the ‘parallel’ measurements are determined 
to be exclusively either up or down but it is in principle impossible for a subject to be 
able to predict what the outcome in her world will be. So prior to measurement Alice is 
necessarily uncertain as to which type of world she inhabits, one where up is destined to 
occur or one where down is destined to occur. She doesn’t know whether she’s an 
Aliceup or an Alicedown. From her point of view, the measuring device in her 
environment behaves exactly as if the outcome were determined stochastically in the 
sense that it will show only one outcome which is in principle impossible to predict and 
a subjective probability can rationally be assigned to the future observation of each 
possible outcome. 
Lewis’s analysis of personal fission, which Saunders and Wallace modify in an 
attempt to generate pre-measurement uncertainty, depends on a metaphysics of 
persistence which Sider calls the worm view  (1996, p. 433). In contrast to stage theory, 
which identifies subjects and objects with the momentary temporal parts of their 
histories, worm theory identifies subjects and objects with linear histories which 
manifest themselves as ‘spacetime worms’. 
The problem presented by personal fission was that Aliceup and Alicedown must be 
regarded as numerically distinct subjects and there’s no criterion for supposing that 
either one was Alice. The stage theory solution to that problem counts Alice, Aliceup 
and Alicedown as each a distinct subject and introduces the temporal counterpart relation 
to describe persistence. The worm theory solution proposed in (Lewis 1976) takes 
Aliceup and Alicedown to be identified with linear histories which have their temporal 
parts in common prior to fission. According to worm theory personal fission does not 
involve the splitting of a subject, it involves the partitioning of the numerically distinct 
linear histories which are the persons involved. Note that histories which partially 
overlap are numerically distinct despite having temporal parts which are numerically 
identical. 
The question then arises as to how each of the Alices pre-measurement can assign 
subjective probabilities to either being an Aliceup or an Alicedown. Deutsch was the first 
to address this problem, which likewise arose for his proposal to supplement quantum 
theory with what he called Axiom 8: 
 
The world consists of a continuously infinite-measured set of universes. 
By a ‘measured set’ I mean a set together with a measure on that set. 
(1985 p. 20)4. 
 
Whereas Saunders’ and Wallace’s partitioning worlds are based on decoherent history 
theory Deutsch proposes an infinite set of initially isomorphic worlds which partitions 
exactly as if stochastic processes were taking place in each of them even though 
processes in each world are assumed to be deterministic. Deutsch’s Alices need to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  An idea developed in a different way in (Barrett 1999, pp. 179-84). 
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assign subjective probabilities equal to the subset measures which correspond to branch 
weights for his scheme, and in order to justify that he introduced a decision-theoretic 
argument, later elaborated by Wallace. (Deutsch 1999, Wallace 2012, pp. 160-189). The 
Deutsch-Wallace argument claims to prove that Alice should assign subjective 
probabilities to the future observation of up and the future observation of down equal to 
the weights of the up and down branches. Unlike the Sebens-Carroll and McQueen-
Vaidman arguments, which consider the perspective of the post-measurement, pre-
observation subject, the Deutsch-Wallace argument considers the perspective of the pre-
measurement subject. All three arguments claim to show that a subject’s assigned 
subjective probabilities to future observations should be equal to what s/he assumes the 
relative branch weights of the outcomes to be. So all three arguments, if good, amount 
to a justification of PP on the assumption that relative branch weight is objective 
probability. 
On the linear histories analysis any subject’s measuring device behaves exactly as 
if it were detecting a stochastic process, the reason being that it is destined so show just 
one outcome which cannot in principle be predicted but for which probabilities can be 
assigned. If branch weight acts as if it were objective probability then there’s no reason 
not to identify it with objective probability: that ‘functionalist’ argument has been 
endorsed by Saunders and Wallace (Saunders 2010, p. 182; Wallace 2012, p. 141). By 
the same argument, if Alice’s detector behaves as if it were measuring a stochastic 
process then there’s no reason not to think that it is detecting a stochastic process.  
So the Saunders-Wallace linear histories proposal is arguably not a deterministic 
theory; it’s a stochastic many-worlds theory in disguise. The supposed determinism in 
each big-bang-to-end-of-time world is not physical it arises out of an alternative 
metaphysical interpretation of the branching process.  
 
3.1 Divergence 
 
Subsequent to the overlap proposal, Saunders has suggested another way of conceiving 
of branching as the partitioning of linear histories (Saunders 2010, p. 196). To contrast 
this concept of partitioning to that involving overlap Saunders uses the term 
‘divergence’, following (Lewis 1986, p. 206). He writes:  
 
worlds in EQM [Everettian quantum mechanics] do not diverge in 
the sense of being physically disconnected (they are not 
physically disconnected, because they superpose, but the issue is 
whether or not they overlap) 
(op.cit., p. 197) 
 
Saunders argues that the Heisenberg picture suggests that the pre-branching segments of 
a set of ‘big-bang-to-end-of-time worlds’ can be thought of as being numerically 
distinct rather than overlapping, and that the mathematics of quantum theory doesn’t 
distinguish between overlap and divergence. The implication is that we are free to think 
of them as numerically distinct; as separate in the sense of being ‘superposed’. Wilson 
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has developed the idea into modified form of Lewis’s ‘modal realism’ (Wilson 2013; 
forthcoming). 
Wallace disagrees with Saunders and Wilson, maintaining that there’s no 
important difference between the overlap and divergence versions of the partitioning 
linear histories interpretation of branching (op.cit., pp. 286-7). But the divergence of 
views here is of no great consequence; the aim of all is to establish pre-measurement 
uncertainty, thought to be absent for a subject who splits. As Wallace has put it: 
: 
none of this is to concede that we cannot make sense of 
uncertainty, or of alternative possibilities, in the Everett 
interpretation. In fact, we can make sense of them just fine, as 
Chapter 7 will argue. 
(op.cit., p. 119) 
 
In Chapter 7 he reiterates the ideas in (Saunders and Wallace 2008). 
And both the overlap and divergence versions of partitioning linear histories, 
whether or not there’s a significant difference between them, view quantum processes 
within a big-ban-to-end-of-time world as if they were stochastic. So, again, by the 
functionalist argument the branch weights of partitioning linear histories arise out of 
stochastic processes, not a deterministic process. It seems that only the fission 
interpretation of branching can yield a deterministic quantum mechanics, if anything 
can. 
And, given the unitary mind interpretation of fission, the Deutsch-Wallace 
argument applies alongside the Sebens-Carroll and McQueen-Vaidman arguments 
regarding a post-measurement, pre-observation subject. The reason being that Alice 
post-measurement, pre-observation is in the presence of a superposition in just the same 
way that Alice pre-measurement was. All that has happened during the measurement 
process is that the object to be measured, which is a microscopic superposition, has 
amplified via decoherence so as to put Alice’s pointer in a superposition of pointing up 
and down. From the unitary mind point of view, what distinguishes the Sebens-Carroll 
and McQueen-Vaidman arguments from the Deutsch-Wallace argument post-
measurement, pre-observation is that the former need the bell and whistle whereas the 
latter doesn’t. 
Finally, to underline the point, all three of these ‘derivations of the Born rule’ 
become possible justifications of PP if the no-collapse postulate is accepted. Because 
they aim to demonstrate that subjective probabilities for future observations should 
equal what the objective probabilities (branch weights) are taken to be.5 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Further thoughts on overlap and divergence can be found in (Tappenden 2019). 
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4 Damned lies and statistics. 
 
An objection sometimes raised against Everettian theory is that it makes quantum 
mechanics unfalsifiable because all ‘possible’ outcomes of measurement processes 
actually occur. That point is forcibly made by Emily Adlam (2014). In this section I 
shall consider how that problem looks given the no-collapse postulate. 
Adlam favorably cites Albert (ibid., p. 26). Here’s an expanded version of that 
citation: 
 
What needs to be looked into, in order to answer the question of 
whether to believe the fission hypothesis is correct, is whether or 
not the truth of that hypothesis is explanatory of our empirical 
experience. And that experience is of certain particular sorts of 
experiments having certain particular sorts of outcomes with 
certain particular sorts of frequencies—and not with others. And 
the fission hypothesis (since it is committed to the claim that all 
such experiments have all possible outcomes with all possible 
frequencies) is structurally incapable of explaining anything like 
that. 
(Albert 2010, p. 359, original emphasis) 
 
It’s notable that Adlam, in extracting her citation from the above passage, replaces 
reference to what Albert calls ‘the fission hypothesis’ with the phrase ‘Everettian 
quantum mechanics’. But that appellation, often referred to as EQM, has come into 
general currency not least via the writings of Saunders, Wallace and Wilson who 
specifically argue for partitioning linear histories interpretations of branching rather 
than the concept of splitting (fission) which was originally introduced by Everett! 
But Albert has left something out. Our experience of certain particular sorts of 
experiments having certain particular sorts of outcomes with certain particular sorts of 
frequencies does not license our belief that quantum mechanics is correct without a 
further assumption. That assumption is that it’s highly improbable that the world has 
conspired to give us results to our experiments which suggest that quantum mechanics 
is true when in fact it’s false. In other words, we have to assume that the data we’ve 
collected is a reliable guide to the way the world is, that it’s a fair sample not a freak 
sample. And of course physicists are obliged to assume that a sufficiently long run of 
experiments does give a reliable result; it would be irrational to do otherwise. And that 
goes for any physicists anywhere in Everett’s multiverse. So physicists in ‘maverick’ 
branches, where frequencies of outcomes do not confirm quantum mechanics, are 
obliged to believe that they have disconfirming evidence. It would be as irrational for 
them to believe they inhabit low-probability branches as it would be for a stochastic 
theorist to believe that an errant experimental run was due to getting an improbable 
sample. 
Adlam precedes her quote with this thought: 
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Thus even if we do happen to occupy one of those branches in 
which the relative frequencies are close to the mod-squared 
amplitudes, this is purely a matter of good luck and not a fact for 
which the amplitudes bear any responsibility, so the amplitudes 
cannot possibly be responsible for our having made the 
observations that we have. 
(op.cit.) 
 
Good luck? If Adlam is implying that it’s improbable that we should get evidence 
confirming quantum mechanics that is clearly not the case given the no-collapse 
postulate if, in fact, quantum mechanics is correct. For if it is correct then the branches 
with the right frequencies for long experimental runs have by far the highest objective 
probability. And in assuming that we get fair samples, as we’re obliged to do, we 
assume that the branches we inhabit have high objective probability and so conclude 
that quantum mechanics is correct. Of course, any physicist launching into an 
experiment to test quantum mechanics today will be a physicist getting disconfirming 
evidence on some branches, given the stage theory analysis of fission, because there’s 
always some probability of getting disconfirming evidence even if the theory is true. 
But on the assumption that quantum mechanics is correct the branches on which that 
occurs will be of very low objective probability and should thereby be accorded very 
low credence in advance. Just like the physicist who believes that quantum processes 
are stochastic, the physicist who believes that they are dendritic must accord some 
credence to coming to find quantum mechanics disconfirmed. Both stochastic and 
dendritic theorists have reason to run experiments. 
 
5 The metaphysical consequences of the unitary interpretation of mind 
 
I have argued that the no-collapse postulate and PP, combined with the fission 
interpretation of branching, can yield a deterministic and objectively probabilistic 
quantum mechanics. The unitary interpretation of mind appears to have a fundamental 
role to play in making that combination of ideas coherent in the face of contrary 
intuitions. The implication is that Everettian theory requires a revisionary metaphysics 
for the constitution of objects in our environment, as I shall now explain. 
The issue is tied up with an argument which originated in a seminal thought 
experiment introduced by Hilary Putnam (1975). That led Putnam to inveigh against 
what he called metaphysical realism, the idea that an objective ‘external word’ exists 
independently of mentality. His argument is succinctly put in (Putnam 1981, Ch. 1). It 
derives from the concept of semantic externalism which was further refined by Tyler 
Burge, inspired by Putnam’s original thought experiment (Burge 1979; 1982). Burge 
described this change of perspective in analytic philosophy as a move away from: 
 
the elderly Cartesian tradition [which puts] the spotlight on what 
exists or transpires ‘in’ the individual – his secret cogitations, his 
innate cognitive structures, his private perceptions and 
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introspections, his grasping of  ideas, concepts or forms. […] This 
[anti-Cartesian] tradition has dominated the continent since 
Hegel. But it has found echoes in English-speaking philosophy 
during this [20th] century in the form of a concentration on 
language. Much philosophical work on language and mind has 
been in the interests of Cartesian or behaviorist viewpoints that I 
shall term ‘individualistic’. But many of Wittgenstein’s remarks 
about mental representation point up a social orientation that is 
discernable from his flirtations with behaviourism. 
(Burge 1979, p. 73) 
 
Putnam also refers to Ludwig Wittgenstein as a harbinger of the ‘anti-individualistic’ 
perspective in analytic philosophy (Putnam 1981, pp. 3, 7 and 20-21). 
The unitary interpretation of mind is intimately connected with the Putnam-Burge 
‘Twin Earth’ arguments for anti-individualistic semantic externalism, as has been 
pointed out (Tappenden, 2017, p. 15). The best way to demonstrate that is to consider 
Putnam’s original thought experiment. I shall give a slightly alternative presentation of 
the idea to capture the essence of the arguments as succinctly as possible. We are to 
imagine that when it was 1750 on Earth there existed somewhere in the universe a Twin 
Earth which was isomorphic to Earth except that every occurrence of water on Earth 
was matched by an occurrence of twater, a different thirst-quenching clear liquid, on 
Twin Earth. Twin Earth might exist anywhere in spacetime, there’s no requirement of 
simultaneity. Whereas water is H2O, twater is XYZ and water and twater would have 
been indistinguishable for anyone living in on Earth in 1750, before modern chemistry, 
supposing that a sample of twater were made available to Earthlings then. Furthermore, 
implausible as it may be, the molecular difference between water and twater would not 
have had any noticeably different consequences for the environments on the two 
planets. 
The externalist argument is that when a person on Earth in 1750 thought about the 
stuff to which they referred by using the term ‘water’ what they were thinking about 
was H2O.  And when that person on Earth was thinking about water it is possible that 
there was a person with an isomorphic body on Twin Earth who was thinking about 
XYZ (we have to ignore the fact that people on Earth have water in their bodies and 
people on Twin Earth have twater, or just suppose that that’s not cognitively 
significant). Thinking about water is different from thinking about twater for they are 
thoughts about different stuffs. The thoughts have different semantic contents despite 
the fact that the thinkers on Earth and Twin Earth have isomorphic bodies. So the 
semantic contents of at least some thoughts cannot be wholly determined by what goes 
on in thinkers’ bodies; that’s semantic externalism. As Putnam put it, ‘meanings just 
aren’t in the head’ (Putnam 1981, p. 19, original emphasis). 
Juhani Yli-Vakkuri has recently made explicit one of the concepts on which such 
arguments depend: a relation of  ‘being corresponding beliefs of duplicate subjects’ 
(Yli-Vakkuri,2018, p. 85) where: ‘Beliefs here must be thought of as tokens rather than 
types’ (ibid., p. 83). 
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Despite its intuitive appeal, the idea that isomorphic doppelgangers are ‘duplicate 
subjects’ having distinct ‘corresponding’ token beliefs is exactly what is challenged by 
the unitary interpretation of mind which entails that the two matched doppelgangers on 
Earth and Twin Earth share a single token thought when thinking about the stuff in 
matched glasses of the clear liquids. That token thought refers to a single sample which 
is the set of the sample of H2O and the sample of XYZ. Any Twin Earth argument for 
semantic externalism is thereby countered since there is a single subject referring to a 
single object rather than two subjects with isomorphic bodies referring to two distinct 
objects with different constitutions. 
This counterargument requires assuming that any set of environmental objects is 
an object which has all and only the properties which its elements share, with some 
exceptions to be listed later. So the single sample referred to in 1750 has a molecular 
constitution which is indefinite because it is a set whose elements have molecular 
constitutions which are different. Introducing the concept of concrete objects which 
have indefinite properties to an argument against semantic externalism establishes a link 
with quantum mechanics. 
The link with quantum fission emerges if we think about our relation to our 
ancestors in 1750. If Twin Earth really could exist then it must be possible that in 1750 
our Earthly ancestors had minds which spanned the two planets. In which case the 
Thames in William Hogarth’s London did not necessarily contain water, it could have 
contained a strange mixture of H2O and XYZ which lacked a definite molecular 
constitution. And what would have happened when chemists first managed to probe the 
constitution of the stuff in rivers and rain is that they split into chemists finding H2O 
here on Earth and chemists finding XYZ on what would now be faraway Twin Earth. 
This point connects with Sarah Sawyer’s recent thoughts on semantic externalism. 
She argues that it guarantees the stability of the ‘subject matter’ of concepts such as that 
of water (Sawyer 2018,	  §4). In other words it guarantees that what Hogarth called water 
is the very same stuff that we call water now. If she’s right, the only possible defense of 
semantic internalism requires that it is possible, given the possibility of Twin Earth, that 
the stuff in Hogarth’s Thames was not H2O, which is what follows from the unitary 
interpretation of mind.  
If semantic internalism is correct then mental content is exclusively a property of 
localized physical objects, most plausibly brains or subsystems of brains; it’s not 
something which involves a relation between brains, their bodies and their 
environments. An accidental cerebral episode (ACE) which is isomorphic to a normally 
embodied and environmentally embedded brain bears all the same mental content. An 
ACE may pop into existence in deep space, or in the heart of a star, due to quantum 
fluctuations in what Bertrand Russell once called ‘a climax of improbability’ (Russell 
1954, p. 33). In recent years ACEs in space have come to be known as Boltzmann 
brains and their widespread existence in the vast tracts of spacetime in which we live is 
taken by many cosmologists to be inevitable. And the widespread existence of ACEs is 
certainly inevitable if quantum fluctuations are dendritic rather than stochastic. That 
vividly raises a problem of Cartesian skepticism: is your brain, now, normally embodied 
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and embedded in the way you think it is or is it an ACE? The unitary interpretation of 
mind brings a new perspective to that old problem. 
So here’s that semantic internalist perspective in a nutshell. To identify an 
individual mind with an individual brain is a mistake similar to identifying a sentence 
with an inscription of it. An individual mind supervenes on any set of sufficiently 
isomorphic brains and/or functionally equivalent objects such as, perhaps, complex 
computers. In any sort of situation where there are multiple doppelgangers in 
isomorphic environments but where the quantity of ‘worlds’ may be any number N, the 
mind of a subject is instanced by a set of N brain-like objects. Token thoughts and 
utterances are instanced by sets of N cerebral and sonic objects. Any environmental 
object to which a subject is able to indexically refer, including their body and brain, is 
constituted by a set of N isomorphic objects (note that elements of such sets are not 
contributed by the environments of ACEs). If there happens to be, in fact, only a single 
instance of a subject’s brain and environment, then environmental objects are taken to 
be self-membered singleton sets known as Quine atoms (Tappenden 2017, p. 10). To 
avoid Russellian set-theoretic paradox self-membership is restricted to Quine atoms. 
Note that any aggregate in the environment would be a Quine atom, as would be its 
parts. 
The unitary interpretation of mind entails that any set of environmental objects 
has all and only the properties which its elements have in common, with exceptions for 
self-membership, number of elements, value-definiteness and mental properties. Mental 
properties are excluded just because subjects are individuated by their mental contents, 
not the instances of those contents. As a consequence, the set of the two gloves making 
an ordinary pair is a glove which has the mass of one and the property of handedness 
but is itself neither a left hand nor a right hand glove. To see why, consider two 
identical rooms with matched doppelgangers in them. There will be a single subject 
whose mind spans the two rooms; call her Diana. Now take an ordinary pair of gloves, 
put each glove in one of a pair of type-identical boxes and put each of the boxes in 
corresponding locations in each of the two rooms. 
Diana sees a single box which is the set of the two boxes. If she weighs it the 
doppelgangers move in concert to place the boxes on matched scales which each show 
the weight of one box plus one glove, so Diana perceives her box as containing an 
object with the weight of one glove. That object is the set of the two gloves. It has the 
property of handedness because the two gloves have that property in common, but 
Diana’s glove is neither left handed nor right handed because the gloves are neither both 
left handed nor both right handed. If Diana opens her box she fissions into a subject 
finding a left hand glove and a subject finding a right hand glove. 
So the unitary interpretation of mind entails that we’re surrounded by objects with 
indefinite properties. Any set of objects in the environment is a concrete object which 
only has definite properties to the extent that its elements have properties in common. 
And recall the Hydra view which suggests that the elements of a superposition are a 
novel type of non-spatial, non-temporal part. If the unitary interpretation of mind is 
correct then the elements of a superposition are not parts at all, they’re elements in the 
set-theoretic sense. Schrödinger’s cat, in the imaginary causally isolated interior of its 
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box, is the set of a dead cat and a live cat whose masses and volumes remain much the 
same whilst their quantum amplitudes change. 
Finally, here’s an oddity which falls short of paradox. Consider three identical 
rooms with matched doppelgangers in them. Given the unitary interpretation of mind 
there’s one subject whose mind spans the three rooms; call her Triana. Now introduce a 
sample of a different shade of grey in each room: Dark, Medium and Light, where 
there’s a just noticeable difference between Dark and Light but not between Dark and 
Medium nor between Medium and Light. If Triana sets eyes on the set of samples she 
will fission into DianaDark and DianaLight each of whose minds will be instanced by a set 
of two brains one of which will be common to both of them. How is that possible?6 
On the currently not implausible hypothesis that minds are instanced by 
mechanisms it may well be that a particular mind can be instanced by any one of a 
range of mechanisms whose differences are not great enough to generate difference of 
perception. As soon as a difference becomes noticeable, whether consciously or 
unconsciously, the subject fissions. DianaDark and DianaLight have a brain in common 
because that brain implements a mechanism compatible with both perceiving Dark and 
perceiving Light. 
 
6 In conclusion 
 
I’ve argued that the introduction of partitioning linear histories interpretations of 
branching to Everettian theory in order to introduce pre-measurement uncertainty is 
unnecessary and arguably involves covertly stochastic quantum processes. In which 
case only Everett’s original fission interpretation of branching can yield a deterministic 
theory. If pre-measurement uncertainty is thought to be necessary for fission then that 
can be made coherent via the unitary interpretation of mind; if it’s not thought to be 
necessary then rational action pre-measurement can still be justified via the Born-
Vaidman rule and the Sebens-Carroll and McQueen-Vaidman arguments. However, 
those latter arguments themselves are more fundamentally motivated by adopting the 
unitary interpretation of mind, which may also be required if the history of a fissioning 
subject is to be understood via stage theory as a partially ordered series of subjects. 
Also, given the no-collapse postulate, the Deutsch-Wallace, Sebens-Carroll and 
McQueen-Vaidman arguments become attempts to justify PP. 
So it appears that the unitary interpretation of mind has a key role to play, together 
with the no-collapse postulate and PP, in making Everettian probability coherent. In 
which case a revised concept of the metaphysical constitution of environmental objects 
is required. If that’s right, Everettian theory does indeed usher in a ‘Copernican’ 
revolution, just as Everett envisaged (op. cit., p. 460). Each of us is splitting incessantly 
because of decoherence processes; each of us has multiple futures. Though the details 
are a complex matter, many processes in nature, such as the weather, are known to be 
chaotic in the sense that they are very sensitive to small differences of input, the so-
called butterfly effect. So if you’re planning an outdoor birthday party months in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  My thanks to Oliver Pooley for raising this question. 
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advance in a temperate climate it’s plausible that the combined weights of the branches 
where it will be fine are substantial, as well as the combined weights of the branches 
where it will rain. There is even rather detailed work which suggests that significant 
quantum fission takes place for an ordinary coin toss (Albrecht and Phillips 2014).  
Everett’s thesis supervisor, John Archibald Wheeler, wrote the following about 
(Everett 1957): 
 
It is difficult to make clear how decisively the ‘relative state’ 
formulation drops classical concepts. One’s initial unhappiness at this 
step can be matched but few times in history. 
(Wheeler, 1957, 464) 
 
When Wheeler was asked, early in the 1990s, why he had given up on Everett’s idea he 
replied, ‘It’s too philosophical’.7 
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